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Abstract
Evolving Board Evaluation Functions for a Complex Strategy Game
Lisa Patricia Anthony
William C. Regli, Ph.D.
The development of board evaluation functions for complex strategy games has been
approached in a variety of ways. The analysis of game interactions is recognized as a
valid analogy to common real-world problems, which often present difficulty in designing
algorithms to solve them. Genetic programming, as a branch of evolutionary computa-
tion, provides advantages over traditional algorithms in solving these complex real-world
problems in speed, robustness and flexibility. This thesis attempts to address the problem
of applying genetic programming techniques to the evolution of a strategy for evaluating
potential moves in a one-step lookahead intelligent agent heuristic for a complex strategy-
based game. This is meant to continue the work in artificial intelligence which seeks to
provide computer systems with the tools they need to learn how to operate within a do-
main, given only the basic building blocks.
The issues surrounding this problem are formulated and techniques are presented within
the realm of genetic programming which aim to contribute to the solution of this problem.
The domain chosen is the strategy game known as Acquire, whose object is to amass wealth
while investing stock in hotel chains and effecting mergers of these chains as they grow.
The evolution of the board evaluation functions to be used by agent players of the game is
accomplished via genetic programming. Implementation details are discussed, empirical
results are presented, and the strategies of some of the best players are analyzed. Future
improvements on these techniques within this domain are outlined, as well as implications
for artificial intelligence and genetic programming.
1Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
This thesis attempts to address the problem of applying genetic programming techniques to
the evolution of a strategy for evaluating potential moves in a one-step lookahead intelligent
agent heuristic to play the game Acquire.
Determining an appropriately intelligent strategy for an agent player is challenging for
several reasons: first, there is often no proven ideal strategy for a given game, making it
difficult to ascertain the degree of optimality one can expect to attain; second, strategy-
based games are complex in the gameplay interactions and the number of possible moves
is large (and hence so is the branching factor for any search approach to the problem);
third, even where expert knowledge may be available, the inclusion of expert knowledge
is wrought with problems itself. Games such as Monopoly and chess require a great deal
of knowledge, planning, and past experience in order to play an effective game against a
worthy opponent. When asked to outline a detailed heuristic to perform a task, however,
experts in a given domain may often forget certain key aspects which are fundamental to
the problem because they seem so trivial. They may not remember other aspects which
come into play only during special circumstances or rarer operations. This can be termed
the “expert dilemma” and caused many problems for the designers of expert systems in the
1980s, which is well-known, and supported by statements in [17].
Therefore, an acceptable alternative to teaching the computer how to operate within
a given domain can be to teach the computer how to learn to operate within that domain.
Simple versions of this are case-based planners; more complex methods include neural net-
works, decision trees, and reinforcement learning. Another interesting technique is that of
evolutionary computation, specifically, genetic algorithms and genetic programming. Ge-
2netic programming is the process of providing the computer with the building blocks to use
in constructing some solution to a problem which the human programmer cannot himself
solve, or can’t solve in an acceptable time frame (i.e., exponential-time algorithms), and
the means to evaluate the degree of “fitness” of a proposed solution. Genetic programming
has been praised as a natural approach to developing algorithmic behaviors [27].
Acquire, a strategy game involving the building of and investing in hotel chains and
effecting mergers of these chains to gain cash rewards, is a game whose dynamics seem
comparable to other games that have been approached via genetic programming. In studies
on other domains such as Backgammon, the “ergodicity” of the game (the reversibility of
the possible outcome at any time during the game due to the randomness of dice rolls),
means that the agents playing can actually learn from the progress of a game even when
they lose [31]. Acquire has a similar random aspect, and this theoretically allows the ge-
netic programming to drive forward toward some optimum solution, as more and more of
the search space is explored due to the changing dynamics within different games. Aspects
of Acquire’s rules of gameplay make this domain a very interesting application of the use
of genetic programming techniques to yield competent player strategies.
1.2 Overview of Approach
There are several steps involved in preparing a genetic programming specification of a prob-
lem. These are to enumerate, as outlined in [1], the architecture of programs to be evolved,
the set of primitive programmatic ingredients, the fitness function, and the parameters for
controlling the run.
In the case of the Acquire game, what are the building blocks? What makes an individ-
ual strategy more “fit” than another? Those familiar with the Acquire domain can recognize
that, during gameplay, one makes use of observations about the state of the world to de-
cide the potential benefit of possible moves. Human players also use knowledge about past
moves and theories about the other players’ strategies in their analysis, but these aspects
3are not incorporated into the problem addressed in this thesis, as we have used a more ba-
sic approach. Probabilistic lookaheads and the concept of utility of certain moves can be
built into future endeavors on the topic. In many applications of reinforcement learning or
autonomous agents, the environment is not fully accessible or static. Simplistic “toy prob-
lems” which allow the agent to operate with full information about the environment are not
representative of most real-world applications of autonomous mobile robots or in certain
games, where the other players’ hands are unknown. Human memory also is not perfect,
and it is preferable not to allow agent players to maintain perfect memory of the progress
of the game, so as not to give them an unrealistic, unfair advantage.
For these reasons, and also because the agents only use a one-step lookahead, and do
not incorporate any long-term planning, our Acquire agents can only make a decision about
a move to make based on the resultant state of the world after that move would be made, in
other words, the utility of that move for the agent.
Although Acquire’s outcome depends on a simple economic utility model (i.e., whichever
agent has amassed the most money wins the game), providing only information about how
much cash is on-hand would be an ineffective strategy, since in order to win money, one
must spend money. (Section 3.1.1 has further details on the Acquire game.) Therefore, we
provide our agents with a larger function set based on the parameters about the world which
are available to the agent, with the intent that this will be more robust than simple reasoning
based on cash assets. We hope to evolve an implicit “lookahead” based on these param-
eters about the world which the agent may combine in interesting ways via the evolution
process. The key to this is providing the functions to extract the appropriate information
about the world to allow this projection to take place, without imposing human biases on
the elements to consider.
We considered several methods of evaluating the fitness of individuals, including the
number of wins in the 10 games played against opponents, the total money earned in the se-
ries of 10 games, and, ultimately, the ratio of money earned by the agent to the total amount
4of money earned in that game by the players. It is important to note that the evolution of
strategies against other agents which are not themselves optimal will not necessarily lead
to an optimal solution. Rather, the functions will only evolve enough to beat the provided
opponents, be they random or hard-coded. In fact, hard-coded opponents are particularly
ill-suited for use in GP because the population will simply evolve to exploit weaknesses
in the hard-coded strategy, and are therefore brittle when placed against other strategies
they had not faced before [27, 31]. Coevolution is designed to force the population toward
optimality without falling into local minima in this way, by pitting the evolving strategies
against other individuals in the same population (or in the other population, in the case of
two simultaneously evolving populations). Therefore, we evolve one population of indi-
viduals whose fitness is judged on the basis of a given number of games played against
randomly-selected opponents from the population, similar to the approach taken by [6].
1.3 Outline of Thesis
Chapter 1 is this introduction to the problem and our approach. Chapter 2 presents some
background information on game theory and genetic programming, including coevolution.
Chapter 3 discusses the approach we took to setting up Acquire as a genetic programming
problem, and certain adaptations which were made, both to the genetic programming tech-
nique and to the Acquire game rules and operation.
Chapter 4 presents the results from our two genetic programming runs, and some dis-
cussion. Finally, Chapter 5 offers conclusions as to the contributions of this research, as
well as its limitations, and a large helping of future and related work, pointing to avenues
which might improve performance in this domain.
5Chapter 2: Background
2.1 The Analysis of Game Interactions and Board Evaluation Functions
The study of games has been used to approximate problems in mathematics, economics,
evolution, social interactions, and many other areas, since the first half of the 20th cen-
tury [44]. A “game” is essentially any situation in which a decision has to be made [12].
The players determine how to allocate their resources based on stimuli from the other
player(s) or the environment, and do so when it is their move (or turn, as in parlor games),
choosing from a variety of available plays. Each player accumulates payoffs, which can
take any form depending on the domain, and whether the game is competitive or cooper-
ative. In competitive games, payoffs to players vary inversely—when one player wins an
amount, the other player(s) either lose that amount or are penalized by not having been
able to win that amount themselves; in cooperative games, the payoffs vary directly, and
the players act as a team or other coordinating unit. Games can also be neutral, wherein
the payoffs to each player are unrelated, as in single-player games against chance, nature
or the environment [7], known as “disinterested players” [13].
During the course of the game, players make use of certain strategies to make their
decision among the various plays available to them in any particular move. In typical
computer approaches to the development of game strategies, certain conditions apply: the
game is of full information (in that the full range of plays available to each player is known
to all); it is competitive and zero-sum (in that the payoffs to one player are the other player’s
losses, or that the players’ interests are diametrically opposed [13]); and it is not necessarily
linear (in that the outcome of the game depends on a series of plays rather than only one).
In our approach, however, we simplify the game construct (to fit Acquire’s model) to
be that of a two-player game where there are a finite range of available plays at each move,
and where the turns proceed in alternating fashion, rather than simultaneously. Our domain
6is not a game of full information, and it is stochastic in nature. This means that a minimax
strategy, whose purpose is to reduce (minimize) the (maximum) damages an opponent can
do in a given play [44], is not appropriate to our domain. The minimax strategy does best in
simple zero-sum games where an equilibrium point exists such that the minimax is the same
point from both players’ perspectives, forcing rational players to make the decisions at the
equilbrium point. In games which incorporate a random element such as a die, however,
there will be no equilibrium point, and trying to decide a move based on minimax does
not help. Acquire is a zero-sum game (also called “constant sum” [12]), but not because
there is a fixed amount of money to win, which is where the term arose. It is still zero-sum
because an Acquire player cannot simply let his opponent play unchecked. For a player to
ensure that he has the most assets at the end of the game himself, he must also curb the
winnings of his opponent. Their interests are in this way “diametrically opposed”.
A very good analogy to the Acquire game scenario which illustrates how the game fits
the zero-sum paradigm is presented in [13] on pages 45 through 46: the best strategies
for two political parties to use in trying to win state electoral votes during presidential
elections. Each state is independent of each other, and so the contest for the votes in New
Jersey is separate from the contest in California. But each party’s candidate must win a
majority of the individual contests to win the general contest for the presidency. Each party
allocates resources for campaigning and publicity within states and must determine the
best distribution strategy. As we will discuss in Section 3.1.1, this scenario is similar to the
contests for majority stockholder in the individual chains on the Acquire board. There can
be only one winner, so both players’ interests are clearly “diametrically opposed”, and the
players must choose how to allocate their resources in order to win the contest for highest
buy-in into the most chains on the board in order to win the game.
Regarding a strategy as a decision-making plan on a global game scale when the game
can be made up of many small contests implies that each particular move can be approached
independently. The ability to evaluate board positions as being either advantageous or
7disadvantageous to a player’s status in the game is part of a successful strategy for most
complex strategy-based games. For our purposes, a strategy-based game is one in which
there is a choice of moves and the outcome of the game depends on the combination of the
values of a series of plays, as opposed to simpler games where the choice of next move is
determined solely by the rules of the game or by chance (for instance, roulette). Often, a
board evaluation function is chosen as a representation of the player’s strategy or heuristic
for gameplay; the player weighs the moves available to him based on the evaluation of
the board state (either now, or as a result of the move being considered) and chooses the
one with the highest value. This approach can succeed for even the most complex games
because, in any finite game, each position or world state represents either a win for the
player under consideration, a loss for that player, or a draw [13]. For this reason, one can
develop a strategy for a game which is based on an analysis of the current board position’s
advantage to the current player.
Natural evolution is itself often viewed as a game, where the players are the biologi-
cal species competing for resources in nature, and each adaptation is a move, the payoff
being which species survives and reproduces [40]. The analogy between games and evolu-
tion leads to interesting possibilities in applying natural evolutionary techniques to certain
games, especially since many games do not fit into the simplified minimax paradigm dis-
cussed above. These games may be solvable via certain heuristics which are not obvious,
and computers can be used as tools to find strategies for these more difficult games. Even
for games where minimax can be performed, but there is interest in reducing computa-
tional complexity caused by the high branching factor, as in Checkers and Backgammon,
evolutionary algorithms yield advantages.
82.2 Evolutionary Computation, Genetic Programming and Coevolution
Machine learning is the larger umbrella under which evolutionary computation and genetic
programming sit. Two areas of artificial intelligence of relevance are knowledge-based ap-
proaches, wherein we tell the computer precisely how to perform a given task; and machine
learning, wherein we tell the computer “precisely how to learn” how to perform tasks (p.
8) [4]. Machine learning is often defined as the study of various techniques by which to
teach computers to learn to do certain things, “without explicit representation of symbolic
knowledge” and hand-coding by the programmer[37]. Evolutionary computation draws on
analogies from Darwinian approaches to biology, ecology and genetics to describe how the
computer system “evolves” toward the correct answer, being given only a means by which
to determine the appropriateness of a certain response.
Evolutionary computation offers advantages over traditional algorithms when attempt-
ing to solve real-world problems for which there may not be a known optimal solution or
even an optimal algorithm to use in solving it. Darwin’s model of evolution essentially de-
fines a complex search and optimization mechanism, designed to allow biological species
to overcome the challenges of nature, including chaos, chance, temporality, and nonlin-
earity [17]. These challenges are often the ones which make the design of algorithms for
real-world problems so intractable. Therefore, by virtue of its analogy with natural evolu-
tionary systems, evolutionary computation possesses several distinct characteristics which
make it a powerful choice of technique for such problems; several of these were discussed
by Fogel in [17]:
 conceptual simplicity—the complex mechanisms of genetics are brilliant in their
simplicity and therefore easy to follow;
 broad applicability—the genetics and evolution analogy has been found to extend to
all areas of real-world optimization problems;
 out-performance of classical algorithms and ability to solve problems with no known
9solutions—exponential-complexity problems can be solved or approximated in much
less time by evolutionary computation methods;
 potential to hybridize with knowledge-based approaches—thereby taking advantage
of what expert knowledge may exist in a domain;
 self-optimization—the population proceeds toward an optimum without the need for
human intervention or guidance.
The genetic programming (GP) paradigm was first described by Nichael Cramer [10],
and later expounded upon by John R. Koza in his 1992 book, Genetic Programming: On
the Programming of Computers by Means of Natural Selection[23]. GP was formulated as
an extension of genetic algorithms [20]. Two good references on the subject are [4, 29].
In GP, the system optimizes a computer program or function to solve a given problem by
generating individual programs or functions and rating their fitness to the solution, choosing
those best fit to survive and allowing them to reproduce. The programs, also known as
genomes, are made up of atoms known as terminals (e.g., state variables or functions of no
arguments) and nonterminals (e.g., functions which take arguments). The first generation
of GP is produced randomly, the individuals are tested via a given “evaluation function” or
“fitness function”, and they are then assigned a score. Next, those individuals with higher
fitness are selected via certain means and allowed to pass on their genetic material to the
following generation via certain procreation operations. See Figure 2.1 for an illustration
of the GP life cycle, after [30, 17].
Initialize
population with
random
individuals
Evaluate fitness of
population (each
individual)
Select individuals
for reproduction
based on fitness
Create new
generation via
reproduction of
the most-fit
individuals
Test termination
criteria (have we
solved the
problem?)
Figure 2.1: Control Flow of the Genetic Programming Paradigm
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Koza’s kernel for GP problems was written in CommonLISP; LISP S-expressions are
natural syntactic ways of representing these individuals’ genomes, since they can be repre-
sented as parse trees and easily manipulated. The LISP code fragments which make up the
individuals form GP trees, such as the one shown in Figure 2.2. That example shows the
following LISP statements:
(+ 4 5)
(if-chain-2-is-safe-from-merging
(- (price-of-chain-1)
(payoff-value-to-player-of-chain-1))
(payoff-value-to-player-of-chain-1))
These statements are built from terminals and nonterminals as mentioned above. Each
internal node is a nonterminal, which takes as arguments its children. Any number of
arguments is permitted, although here only binary functions are shown. The leaves of the
GP tree are terminals.
+
4 5
IF-CHAIN-2-IS-
SAFE-FROM-
MERGING
-
PAYOFF-
VALUE-TO-
PLAYER-OF-
CHAIN-1
PRICE-OF-
CHAIN-1
PAYOFF-
VALUE-TO-
PLAYER-OF-
CHAIN-1
Figure 2.2: Examples of Parse Trees for Various LISP S-expressions
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The evaluation function (fitness function) is also provided to the GP system during
problem specification. After the random initialization of the population in the first gener-
ation, the GP algorithm determines the fitness of each individual via this fitness function,
selects the most fit genomes, and breeds them to a new generation. The fitness function
is highly problem-specific. In symbolic regression (the interpolation of a mathematical
function based on a set of input and output values), for example, the fitness function is
generally the number of data points the individual matches within some margin of error.
In certain games, tournaments among the individuals are run and the fitness of each indi-
vidual is defined to be the rank in the tournament that individual attains. The algorithm
terminates when an optimally fit individual has been found, or when the predetermined
number of generations has completed. Which termination criteria is more appropriate is
also problem-specific.
The breeding operators which are most commonly used are reproduction, crossover and
mutation. The reproduction operator chooses a relatively fit individual and passes it on to
the next generation unchanged. When the most fit individuals, or some fraction thereof,
are reproduced for every generation, it is called elitism. In crossover, shown in Figure 2.3,
subtrees within two individuals are swapped at random; the subtrees do not have to be of
the same size or occur in the individuals in the same position in the genome. Mutation,
shown in Figure 2.4, is generally one-point mutation, and involves the replacement of a
given subtree in the genome with some randomly generated subtree (not necessarily of the
same depth as the tree it is replacing).
Some researchers may be tempted to dismiss the techniques of GP as little more than
blind random search. Indeed, it is true that genetic programming can be thought of as a
guided “beam search”, where the algorithm is limited to areas of the search space which
satisfy a certain criteria; here, the fitness function acts as the beam [23]. The selection and
reproduction operators open new areas of the search space to be explored by instantiating
potential solutions within these subspaces to be considered. Consider that the solution(s)
12
IF-CHAIN-2-IS-
SAFE-FROM-
MERGING
-
PAYOFF-
VALUE-TO-
PLAYER-OF-
CHAIN-1
PRICE-OF-
CHAIN-1
PAYOFF-
VALUE-TO-
PLAYER-OF-
CHAIN-1
IF-CHAIN-2-IS-
SAFE-FROM-
MERGING
PAYOFF-
VALUE-TO-
PLAYER-OF-
CHAIN-1
+
PAYOFF-
VALUE-TO-
PLAYER-OF-
CHAIN-2
PAYOFF-
VALUE-TO-
PLAYER-OF-
CHAIN-1
+
PAYOFF-
VALUE-TO-
PLAYER-OF-
CHAIN-1
+
PAYOFF-
VALUE-TO-
PLAYER-OF-
CHAIN-2
PAYOFF-
VALUE-TO-
PLAYER-OF-
CHAIN-1
IF-CHAIN-2-IS-
SAFE-FROM-
MERGING
PAYOFF-
VALUE-TO-
PLAYER-OF-
CHAIN-1
-
PRICE-OF-
CHAIN-1
PAYOFF-
VALUE-TO-
PLAYER-OF-
CHAIN-1
Figure 2.3: Examples of One-Point Crossover at a Function Point in a Parse Tree
to the type of problems genetic programming addresses are typically only one or a few
points in a space with a vast number of possibilities, and these possibilities are determined
by the number of possible programs which can be generated by the given set of terminals
and nonterminals based on the branching factor determined by arguments taken by each
nonterminal and by the allowable depth of individuals. While typical GP techniques may
examine up to 10,000 or 100,000 individuals [28], this is still a far smaller number than the
total number of possible individuals. Of the total number of individuals, vast stretches of
the search space are filled with completely unfit individuals which cannot lead to promising
end results. The GP evaluation loop acts as both a filter and a lens, sifting out areas of
the search space which are unprofitable to explore and focusing the progress of evolution
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Figure 2.4: Examples of One-Point Mutation of a Parse Tree
in directions which lie along certain key paths through the space of possibilities. For a
more in-depth discussion of this and other arguments supporting GP as an independent
improvement over blind random search, see Chapter 9 of Koza’s 1992 book [23].
GP was first used for symbolic regression, that is, the interpolation of a mathematical
function based on certain data points. Individuals are scored based on the number of the
data points they can match or approximate within some error margin. GP has had much
success evolving the optimal solution, or individuals which are functionally equivalent to
the optimal solution, as the generations progress. Some problems, however, do not have
an easily available optimal solution or expert player (as in the case of game strategies). In
this case, a fixed fitness function may not be appropriate. Coevolution has been proposed
as a means by which to avoid the paradoxical need for an optimal solution while trying to
evolve one [33]. Coevolution allows the population to evolve by competing against each
other; this causes the problem to become more difficult naturally as the individuals in the
population improve [25].
There are several different coevolution paradigms. The first is modeled after natural
coevolution in the biological/ecological world, wherein two separate populations (i.e., two
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separate species) balance the relationship between themselves, as in predator-prey relation-
ships. In this case, the fitness of one population is determined by how well it performs
(survives) against the other population. This sort of coevolution is seen throughout the nat-
ural world, and amounts to a sort of biological “arms race” [21], meaning both populations
progress toward some unknown optimum, compounding adaptation upon adaptation. As
one species of plant develops a tough outer shell to resist attacks by a certain insect preda-
tor, the species of insect develops a stronger mandible. The plant then develops a poison to
kill the insect, but ultimately the insect develops an immunity to this poison, and so on, ad
infinitum (example from [23]).
A second type of coevolution is also called “self-play”, wherein the population’s fitness
is determined by competition amongst its own individuals [5]. This is analogous to resource
competition in nature. This is the type of coevolution we chose to use; it is more logical
in situations where the competition is symmetric. In a predator-prey competition, the re-
lationship is not symmetric: each population has a different goal (the predator attempts to
catch the prey, and the prey attempts to elude the predator). In many game domains, how-
ever, the competition is symmetric such that neither player has an advantage over the other
merely by virtue of the domain constraints. While some games have distinct first-player
advantages, Acquire is not one of these.
However, the changing fitness function that coevolution provides as an advantage for
game domains presents a problem in itself: that of determining whether the population is
actually making any progress toward the optimum at all. Because the population is judged
against itself, as generations pass, the fitness function itself changes. This is called the “fit-
ness landscape” and alters as more fit individuals are judged against their neighbors, who
are also more fit (assuming the population is progressing). [9] describes what is known as
the “Red Queen effect” in coevolutionary interactions: the populations, by nature of their
interaction alter the fitness landscape. The effect is named after the Red Queen character in
Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, who was always running but never getting any-
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where, because the landscape moved as she did. In essence, the horizon is always the same
distance away. A graph of the performance of the individuals over time, which is relative to
the others, may not have the upward slope we are expecting, even though progress may be
occurring. This problem was pointed out by [9, 35, 36]. As the population gets better, it’s
more difficult for them to beat each other. Techniques have been developed to monitor the
monotonicity of the progress more carefully [9]: tournaments of the population champions
against all previous champions (“ancestral opponent contests”); and distance metrics using
similarity of the parse trees developed (“genetic distance measures”). These visualization
and measurement techniques help allow the true progress of the population to emerge.
Coevolution presents the corollary issue of collusion, wherein the players “cooperate”
to repeatedly draw against one another, or wherein the problem scope becomes so narrow
over the course of generations that, effectively, the same game is played by the players
each time. In this case, one population has fallen into a subarea of the search space which
the second population does not use (cover), and in this way they will avoid competition.
Certain domains will prevent this naturally, however, via certain characteristics: ergodic-
ity (i.e., reversibility), stochasticity, and continuity of the domain combine to make this
simple partitioning of the search space not possible [5]. It follows from familiarity with
the Acquire domain that it fits these characteristics. The random elements of gameplay
alone ensures that different areas of the board will be developed at different times, forcing
strategies to be robust enough to compensate for various situations and interactions.
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Chapter 3: Approach: Architecture and Implementation
3.1 Core Acquire Agent System
The Acquire Agent System began as a simple distributed agent planning system imple-
mented in Common LISP and Java. The purpose of the project was to design and imple-
ment an agent system which was capable of playing the game Acquire, a trademark of
Hasbro, formerly Avalon Hill [19]. Eventually that system was modified and updated to
function as the core for the genetic programming experiments which are the object of this
thesis.
3.1.1 Discussion of Acquire Game Play
Acquire is a multi-player strategy game which has been called similar to Monopoly in
concept and objective (see Figure 3.1). For two to six players, the game’s objective is to
build up hotel chains on the board squares, buy stock in these chains, and effect mergers
which yield payoffs to those who own stock in the merged chains. The game operates on
the simple economic model of monetary gain; the player with the most money at the end
of the game is the winner.
Each agent’s turn proceeds in three phases. The first is the “place-tile” phase, during
which the player must choose one of the 6 labeled tiles he is holding in his hand and place
it on the corresponding square on the board. This tile placement can have one of several
effects: it can create a new hotel chain if it is adjacent to another tile which is not yet in
a chain; it can increase the size of an existing hotel chain; it can cause a merger if it is
adjacent to tiles which are in two or more different chains; or, most simply, it can be placed
alone on the board.
During a merger, the larger chain “wins” and consumes the smaller one. Each ho-
tel/tile which was previously in the now-defunct chain is subsumed by the larger chain.
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of the Acquire Board and Some Key Aspects of Game Play
Stockholder bonuses are distributed, one to the player which owns the most stock in the
now-defunct chain, and one to the runner-up. These bonuses are determined by the clas-
sification of that chain (low-value, medium-value, high-value) and its size at the time of
merging. Because the smaller chain is no longer active on the board (although it can be
played again in the future), all players who own stock in this chain may choose to either
sell their shares or trade them in for stock in the winning chain.
After the merger has been handled, the player’s turn continues. Next, the player must
decide what stock, if any, to buy in any of the hotel chains currently on the board (including
any created during this turn). Because the stockholder bonuses are the only way to make
money during the game, it is to the player’s advantage to be the majority stockholder in
as many chains as possible. In addition, whenever a player’s tile placement creates a new
chain, he receives one stock in that chain for free. After buying stock, the player draws a
new tile at random from the central pot. Play proceeds in this fashion until the end of the
game occurs under one of the following circumstances: a player plays his last tile; a chain
reaches a certain large size; or all chains are above a certain no-merger threshold.
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Due to the interaction between the place-tile phase and the buy-stock phase, there is a
heavy element of strategy to gameplay. Because the overall monetary assets of the players
at the end of the game determine who the winner is, and because the only way to gain
money is to receive shareholder bonuses for being the primary or secondary stockholder
when a chain merges, all decisions must revolve around what stock a player owns, and
how close to catching up in quantity one’s opponent(s) may be. Losing the majority share-
holder’s bonus in a valuable chain may have a severe damaging effect on the outcome of
that player’s game. If one player wins a majority shareholder’s bonus, the other players are
unable to win this money, so it is a loss in status as far as game standings. In the same way,
if one player buys three stocks in a particular chain, the other player has three less available
to him, which may lead to his eventual inability to gain a majority stockholder’s bonus in
that chain.
3.1.2 The System
The Acquire system is implemented in CommonLISP, modeled as a central game controller
and an agent interface for each player. Each agent-player has the ability to manipulate a
hypothetical state of the world which is updated after each event in the game. The Acquire
system uses some aspects of the CommonLISP Object System (CLOS) in an attempt to
reduce memory costs; however, space constraints were never a major concern. LISP speed
optimizations were also not focused on, in spite of the high computational demands of
genetic algorithms and genetic programming. To manage these high time demands, we
used a compiled version of the system when playing games with our evolved strategies.
This compiled version ran nearly a factor of 10 faster than the interpreted version, and this
time frame was sufficient for our needs.
To make the choice of what move to make in a given turn, an agent player considers
each possible move available to him on his current turn, both for the tile-placement decision
and the stock-purchase decision, and how this move would change the state of the world.
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He uses the evolved evaluation function on each of the resulting states of the world (i.e.,
one for each possible move), to determine which one is most advantageous to him. Three
types of agent players are supported by our Acquire system: a random agent picks moves
at random without considering how they may affect the world; a smart agent actually uses
a function to evaluate the state of the world; and a human agent requests input from the
user as to which move to make.
The game is by nature stochastic in that a player does not know what moves will be
available to him in the future due to the randomness of the tile drawing, or what moves
his opponents have available. We decided to focus on the evolution of a board evaluation
function, rather than a full-on strategy. The difference is that a strategy is typically thought
of as some organized set of condition-action pairs, where the condition is based on some
test or evaluation of the state of the world, and the action is the move to make. An evaluation
function, however, is simply the condition part of this; the evaluation function tests the state
of the world and returns a number representing the value assigned to that state of the world.
Because Acquire players have a widely varying choice of moves to make from turn to turn,
there is the desire to constrain moves the agent is allowed to consider to be legal moves
only. In evolving a strategy, the agent will be able to recognize what moves would be best
to make, but these may not necessarily be ones currently available to him. In the remainder
of this thesis, however, we will use the term “strategy”, so as not to be confused with the
genetic programming individual fitness evaluation function.
3.2 The Genetic Programming Extensions
The Acquire system was adopted as the core of a genetic programming problem in the vein
of those from Koza’s 1992 book [23]. Koza’s genetic programming kernel code, imple-
mented in CommonLISP, was taken and slightly adapted for our purposes. These adapta-
tions are explained below. When designing a problem to be solved via GP, there are several
fundamental steps. First, the architectural representation of the program or algorithm to
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be developed must be specified; in our approach, we use Koza’s LISP S-expression parse
trees. Second, one must provide the language elements the GP system can use in evolving
the programs (in our case, board evaluation functions). Third, one must provide the fitness
function to use in determining which individuals perform better at the given problem than
others, such as a metric based on the ability of certain individuals to win. Fourth and fi-
nally, one must define certain GP operation parameters which may have values specific to
the problem at hand [1]. The formulation of the Acquire strategy-evolution problem as a
GP problem drew on Koza’s explanation of the required elements for such a problem [23]:
The terminal set. Our intuition about the structure of the state-evaluation function which
we were evolving directed us to consider it as some combination of certain parameters
about the current state of the world; therefore, we decided to use these parameters as our
terminal set, to be combined with simple arithmetic operators. Anything which is visible
to a human player of Acquire at a given time point in the game, minus the effect of human
memory of opponent moves, is available to be queried by the smart agent. The program
evolved by the GP system is plugged into the Acquire system as the evaluation function
for one of the agent players, so the parameters are accessed via functions which the Ac-
quire system can execute during gameplay. See Appendix A for the complete table of all
terminals used and their descriptions.
The board-querying functions are of the form size-of-chain-1, size-of-chain-
2, distance-to-nearest-neighbor-of-chain-1,cash-held-by-player, and so
on, where chain-1 refers to the largest chain, chain-2 refers to the middle-sized chain,
and chain-3 refers to the smallest chain. The game actually uses seven possible hotel
chains, which would result in a combinatorial explosion of parameters to consider (over
50). The difficulty with this is the computational time it could take to evaluate the relation-
ships between these parameters. It is tempting to reduce the number of parameters based
on our own assumptions about which ones may be relevant to a given decision. However,
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once the decision has been made to allow the computer to evolve its own strategy, one can-
not make any judgments about what parameters about the world “don’t apply” to certain
move-making decisions. We made an initially rather arbitrary choice to reduce the problem
to allow only three possible hotels as described above, which decreases the computational
complexity considerably, while still allowing the system to use all possible observations
about the state of the world in fixing its strategy. As we later discovered with human play-
ers, though, the game with only three hotels is both slow and uneventful over long periods
of time, and the potential to earn money is drastically reduced. However, although the rules
of the game have been changed by this stipulation, the application of the GP technique is
the focus of this thesis, and the minor changes to the game which result from reducing the
number of hotel chains available do not affect the GP system’s evolutionary progress.
The function set. There is some precedence for a genetic programming approach to
evolving board evaluation functions for complex strategy games [16, 15]. The nonterminal
sets in these cases included conditional operators to reflect the complexity of the strategies
needed to play certain games (i.e., in certain combinations of situations, the board value
would be higher than in certain others, or perhaps two conflicting set of situations would
affect the value of a given state). However, our original idea was that this evaluation func-
tion we were evolving would be similar to a utility function. According to Russell and
Norvig [37], multi-attribute utility functions where the attributes are independent of each
other can be combined (in theory) via simple arithmetic functions. While we had intended
to explore the possibility of incorporating probabilistic reasoning in the strategy, the repre-
sentation utilized both by the GP system and the Acquire system did not lend itself readily
to the evolution of neural networks and other reinforcement learning techniques which have
been discussed in the literature (see Section 5.3).
However, we did want to enable complex strategizing based on less fundamental board
state operations. For example, if a player is the majority stockholder in chain X, and the
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move under consideration would merge chain X with another, larger chain, the resulting
board state should have a high value compared to one in which the player’s opponent owns
the majority. Therefore, in addition to the four basic arithmetic operators: +, -, *, and
div (where div is a protected division operator to guard against divide-by-zero errors),
we have also included three conditional operators that hinge on certain board states being
true. We did not simply include logical and decision operators like if, and, or, and not,
because this would have required strongly-typed GP in our implementation of the problem
(see Section 5.3 for more on this).
See Appendix A for a complete list of all functions used and their descriptions.
Problem-specific functions. Often, some domains require other functions which the GP
system uses to help in its creation of new individuals or its evaluation of them. In our
case, the entire Acquire system is used as the method of evaluation, and so it could be said
that the Acquire game functions are problem-specific functions needed for this problem.
In addition, the div function and functions for choosing a random set of opponents were
included in the kernel.
Fitness cases. We entertained the idea of several options as to how to evaluate the fitness
of individuals, including the number of wins in the 10 games played against opponents, the
total money earned in the series of 10 games, and, ultimately, the ratio of money earned
by the agent to the total amount of money earned in that game by both players. Fitness
of individuals in the population can be evaluated simply based on a binary “win-lose”
statement when the individual is pitted against an opponent in a game. One can also use
a “degree” of fitness, based on how much of a monetary advantage (or disadvantage) the
individual had over his opponent at the end of the game. In these situations, the opponents
could be random agents, or agents which are also using some sort of evolved strategy.
Ultimately, our problem specification did not use fitness cases in the strictest sense of
word and as intended in Koza’s kernel. The fitness cases for this domain, rather, consist of
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several games played within the Acquire system using the current individual as the evalu-
ation function for one of the agent players. We chose 10 games to be fairly representative
without causing the time needed to complete a run to explode. The agents played against
a random sample of other agents from that generation of the population, as a simple form
of coevolution using competitive fitness. The fitness of an individual was defined to be
the average over 10 games of the ratio of money earned in each game to the total money
earned in that game by both players. This ratio penalized players for losing disgracefully,
and rewarded players who won by a large margin more than those that won by a very small
margin.
Result from evolved program. The wrapper function which obtains the result from the
evolved program (the evaluation function) plays a game of Acquire and extracts the final
standings. The ratio of earnings in that game is calculated.
Test result against fitness cases and return a score. Here, our problem is also different.
When all 10 games are played, the average ratio is determined and adapted as the stan-
dardized fitness. The standardized fitness is defined such that lower numbers mean higher
fitness.
Problem-specific parameters. As has been noted in other literature on genetic program-
ming and evolutionary computation, parameter-setting is often a “black art”, with no real
justifiable reason to choose certain parameters over others, other than they yield better re-
sults after empirical testing [11].
In our case, we chose 10 fitness cases because playing only one game would certainly
be too random; the agent could have had a particularly lucky game and not won based
on its strategy at all, or vice versa for its opponent. We did not want a currently high-
ranked individual to be unseated by a lucky novice challenger. This is actually referred to
by Pollack and Blair as the “Buster Douglas effect” [31]. However, any number of games
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over 15 would take too much computer brawn than was available to us to evaluate in any
reasonable amount of time (we were attempting runs in the space of hours or days, rather
than weeks).
The maximum depth to search and the maximum depth for individuals was set at five
to avoid highly bloated individuals which would slow down evaluation. Crossover ratios
and mutation indices were kept as the defaults which Koza himself used in his other sam-
ple problems [23]: crossover at any point was kept at 20%, and at function points was
kept at 70%, to bias crossovers to occur at function points. The mutation rate during the
reproduction operator was kept at 90%.
The termination criterion. Typically, a genetic programming run is allowed to terminate
when an ideal individual has been found (i.e., one that satisfies all the fitness cases). When
evolving a game strategy, however, there is no ideal example, and any number of individ-
uals could perform well. Coevolution is meant to drive the evolution forward, so the best
choice is to push through a given number of generations. Therefore, our only termination
criterion was the completion of the number of generations which we forced our GP system
to execute.
See Table 3.1 for a summary of the problem outline, including parameter values.
As mentioned in Section 1.2, it is important to realize that the evolution of strategies
against other agents which are not themselves optimal will not necessarily lead to an op-
timal solution. The functions will only evolve far enough toward optimality to beat the
provided opponents, be they random or hard-coded. Hard-coded opponents are particularly
ill-suited for use in GP because the population will simply evolve to exploit weaknesses in
the hard-coded strategy, and would therefore be brittle when placed against other strategies
they had not faced before [27, 31]. On the other hand, coevolution is designed to force
the population toward optimality without allowing it to fall into local minima, by pitting
the evolving strategies against other individuals in the same population (or in the other
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Table 3.1: The Acquire GP Problem Specification
Objective: To find a board evaluation function for playing the game
of Acquire.
Terminal Set: A comprehensive-as-possible list of board feature
extraction functions, the digits from 0..9, and a random
floating-point constant.
Function Set: The four simple arithmetic functions, and three conditional
operators based on desirable board features, all taking
2 arguments.
Fitness Cases: n/a
Raw Fitness: The average ratio of money won in the 10 games played where
each ratio is the proportion of the total money earned in that game
which the given individual is responsible for.
Standardized Fitness: We subtract the raw fitness from 1.0 to force smaller
values to imply higher fitness.
Hits: n/a
Wrapper: The wrapper extract the amount of money won by that agent
compared to its opponent in a particular game of Acquire
from the final standings.
Parameters: Population size = 1000, Number of Generations = 50.
Success Predicate: No success predicate is used; the GP run proceeds until all
generations have been executed.
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population, in the case of two simultaneously evolving populations). We did not use two
populations, as is done in much of the literature on competitive coevolution [23, 36, 33], be-
cause in those cases, the two opponents are asymmetric. For instance, in the predator-prey
problem, an opponent is evolved to be either the predator or the prey. In games such as Tic-
Tac-Toe or Nim (pick-up sticks), the player to move first in a game has an advantage over
the second player, and the overall strategies therefore differ slightly [35]. This is largely
true because the games are so simple and the branching factor is small, lending the game
to global analysis. In games such as Acquire, Backgammon, and Checkers [6], however,
the opponents are effectively symmetric. In any given state, it is true that one player might
have an advantage over the other based on who gets to move next, and a localized strategy
might be more effective for each turn. As this advantage can pass from one to the other
as turns progress, any general, global strategies developed (as we are attempting) must not
overfit to these potentially transient advantages. Therefore, we use one population whose
fitness is judged on the basis of a given number of games played against randomly-selected
opponents from the population, similar to the approach taken by [6].
Initially, we actually perceived our domain as providing two separate GP problems to
solve. During an agent’s turn, as mentioned in Section 3.1.1, he faces two choices. The first
is which tile to place; the second is which chain to invest in. These strategies are sufficiently
separated (we believed) to support their separate evolution. It was unclear in our early
stages of familiarity with GP techniques, how to evolve two separate trees using Koza’s GP
code without altering it significantly, as Luke did for his kick and dash trees in evolving
soccer-playing softbots for the Robocup simulation league [26]. In hindsight, this may not
have been as difficult as was believed when the project was begun. In fact, there are strong
reasons justifying the evolution of one player strategy with both functions incorporated,
centering around the “credit assignment problem”, mentioned in much of the literature
where coordinating programs must be evolved [27, 18]. The credit assignment problem
refers to the difficulty of assigning fitness to the individuals in a team based on a win or
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loss. How much of the win can be credited to any one individual? How much of the loss
can be claimed to be a certain individual’s “fault”? While computationally more complex,
and requiring some amount of structural constraints (see Section 5.3), evolving teams as
a unit sidesteps this credit assignment problem. In effect, the tile-placement function and
the stock-purchase function pair must coordinate with each other to maximize the winning
potential of the agent using them. To avoid the credit assignment problem, one would
evolve the two functions as a unit, to avoid the later problem of figuring out how to combine
them.
Nevertheless, before the credit assignment problem emerged as an issue, it was decided
to evolve populations of place-tile evaluation functions separately from populations of buy-
stock evaluation functions. We provided them both identical terminal sets and function sets,
in an attempt to decrease the effect of our human prejudices as to which factors may be im-
portant in either decision. Of course, we recognized that, to have a real strategizing Acquire
agent, it must include functions for both of decisions to be made in a turn. Therefore, at
the conclusion of our GP runs to evolve these decision functions separately, we chose a run
for each population at random and also ran an all-pairs competition to see which pair of
buy-stock and place-tile functions worked the best together. See Section 4.3 for details.
We used tournament selection because, as is justified by [21], it reduces the number of
evaluations needed, and because there is no exhaustive set of test cases for Acquire, making
fitness-proportionate selection (selection based on the proportion of fitness cases matched)
meaningless. Tournament selection was introduced by Angeline and Pollack [3], in order
to reduce the number of competitions needed and to force the population to avoid local
minima traps.
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3.2.1 Adaptations to the Acquire Domain
Certain adaptations to the original game of Acquire were incorporated into our system,
for various reasons, and are discussed below. First, the number of hotel chains in the
game is actually seven, but we decreased this number to three, to decrease the number of
functions our GP would have to manipulate during evolution. With seven distinct hotels,
our terminal set size was greater than 50. We determined that this would unnecessarily tax
our system. In addition, because strategies should not be dependent on certain chain names,
but rather should be based on their current positions on the board (i.e., size and neighbors),
we simplified the problem to largest chain, medium chain, and smallest-chain. Evaluation
functions based on these parameters rather than hard-coded for chain names are inherently
more robust in evolution. It is easy to see that in a certain game where CHAIN-1 may be
the largest and the agent’s evaluation function has a reference to its size, the agent may do
well and advance to the next generation, but then suddenly do much more poorly in the
next game because the circumstances are very different.
Second, we reduced the game to a one-on-one competition rather than allowing multi-
ple opponents to play against the evolving agents. This was done to reduce the time and
computational complexity of playing through one game. Since the fitness evaluation of
each agent requires 10 games to be played, it was essential that each game not be a bot-
tleneck for system performance. Reducing the number of players in the game changes the
dynamics of a human-played game, as well as affecting the total amount of money possible
to win (but not decreasing the validity of measuring a ratio). The multi-player version of
this game is a much more complex, chaotic problem that could be interesting to study in
future work in this area.
Another simplification involved the other, more minor in-game choices a player may
sometimes have to make. When a chain is created, the player is allowed to choose which
one it will be; when two chains of equal size merge, the player is allowed to choose which
one will triumph; when certain end-game conditions are met, the player is allowed to
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choose to end the game or not. Because of our desire to focus on the core of the strat-
egy of this complex domain, these minor decisions are relatively unimportant, and in the
current system, the engine performs a random choice of the available options. We did not
want to have to evolve behaviors for dealing with these other three minor decisions as well,
since only the place-tile and buy-stock decisions are the driving force behind the game
progress. While it can be argued that the three minor choices above have the potential to
turn the tide of a game, the extent to which this is possible was deemed inconsequential to
the overall strategy.
3.2.2 Adaptations to Koza’s Genetic Programming Kernel
To support the execution of our evolutionary experiments, we also made a few changes
to Koza’s GP kernel. In our preliminary experiments, we experienced a lack of progress
due to certain issues. One problem was that potentially good individuals were often lost
as time went by because the best individuals were not guaranteed to survive to the next
generation. This is acceptable for fixed-fitness-based domains such as symbolic regression,
or deterministic games, like the examples in Koza’s book [23], because, when an individ-
ual is found which satisfies all fitness cases, it can be recognized as the optimum, or a
functional equivalent. However, for Acquire, it can be argued, as for many other complex
strategy games, that there exists no optimum strategy. Therefore, we want to encourage the
promotion of evaluation functions which do very well against others, in case that a particu-
larly strong strategy is discovered in a very early generation. To this end, we implemented
a version of forced elitism within Koza’s kernel, which did not otherwise support it. We
saved the best 2% individuals from each generation and added them to the next generation’s
population, unchanged.
The second change we made to Koza’s kernel was to add a simplified version of coevo-
lution, which was also not supported by his code. In this version, to determine an individ-
ual’s fitness, we chose 10 individuals at random (without replacement) from the population
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and played the games against these agents. Since no optimal strategy was known, and since
hard-coding strategies only leads to the evolution of brittle, inflexible strategies capable of
exploiting the weaknesses in the provided opponents but not others [31, 27], coevolution
was the logical alternative. To reduce the number of evaluations we needed to perform,
both players receive credit for the game, even the individual not currently being evaluated
by the GP system. This meant that some players never had to enter an evaluation loop, as
they had already played 10 games against other players during their evaluation loops.
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Chapter 4: Experimental Results
4.1 Genetic Programming Runs
We ran several preliminary experiment sets, to try to determine what set of parameters gave
us the best up-slope in the early generations. After this, we performed the actual GP runs.
We ran 10 experiments for each decision population (the Place-Tile function and the Buy-
Stock function), and analyzed the means over these 10 runs. This redundancy was to allow
us to more effectively argue for any trend line that may have resulted, and to eliminate the
effect of noise and domain stochasticity on the results. Preliminary results indicated that
the two decision populations varied from each other; the shape and magnitude of the curves
differ enough to show the two populations have evolved separately. See Figures 4.1 and 4.2
for illustrations of the differences in individuals’ size between the two decision populations.
This shows that, although the two populations were provided with the same terminal and
nonterminal sets, they evolved very differently due to the nature of the problem to which
the individuals were applied.
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Figure 4.1: Average Size of Individuals in each Generation for Place-Tile Population, Mean
Over 10 Runs
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Figure 4.2: Average Size of Individuals in each Generation for Buy-Stock Population,
Mean Over 10 Runs
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4.1.1 Place-Tile Decision Population Evolution
The first graph for the Place-Tile decision population is shown in Figure 4.3. It shows the
mean over 10 runs of the performance of the best individual from each generation (not
necessarily the same individual from one generation to the next) over time, as a function
of the fitness metric used to guide evolution: the ratio of money earned by the player in
his games compared to the total amount of money earned by both players in these games.
A higher number in this case reflects a more fit individual; for instance, a ratio of 0.75
represents an individual which is keeping a good majority of the profits available in a game
for himself.
We hope that, as time goes on, the strategies are able to achieve higher levels of income
in a game, as a result of more intelligent stock purchases and the effecting of timely merg-
ers. The data from any one run is quite noisy, which can be seen from the scatterplot shown
in Figure 4.5, probably due to the random nature of the Acquire game domain (random-
ness forces other areas of the search space to be explored, forcing strategies toward more
generality and penalizing those which are too specific). The cloud shown in the scatterplot
illustrates that there are no outlying runs obscuring trends in the data overall. Analysis of
the means plotted in Figure 4.3 is not much more promising; there is a very slight upward
trend as the generations progress, but even the means are still showing a lot of noise be-
tween generations. Note the small scale used on the y-axis in this graph; although the trend
is increasing, it is extremely gradual, implying that more generations may be needed.
Another metric of progress we considered was the average standardized fitness for the
population in each generation as reported by the GP system during the run. As above,
recall that raw fitness is the average ratio of earnings of an individual in a game to the
total earnings in that game by both players, and that the fitness is then standardized by
subtracting it from 1.0, meaning that lower numbers reflect more fit individuals. The graph
shown in Figure 4.7 displays the means over 10 runs of the average standardized fitness
over all individuals in a population for each generation. Again, the means graph still suffers
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from noise, and here the downward trend is not as steep (note that the scales are different
between the two figures).
These results are discouraging, because one would hope that any noise present at vary-
ing points throughout the runs would be counteracted via using the means analysis of sev-
eral runs. That the jagged lines still occur suggest that the populations are evolving in very
similar fashions throughout each run, across runs. Each run’s own data does not in fact
have the same shape, so the runs are not exact replicas of each other, but they do appear
to exhibit parallel behavior across runs in the same generations. Further analysis of these
results is left to Section 4.2.
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Figure 4.3: Performance of the Best Individual from Each Generation for Place-Tile Popu-
lation, Mean Over 10 Runs (Note: graph is analyzed in Section 4.1.1.)
0.555
0.56
0.565
0.57
0.575
0.58
1 3 5 7 9 11

13

15

17

19

21

23

25

27

29

31

33

35

37

39

41

43

45

47

49

Ge nerations
F
itn
e
s
s
Figure 4.4: Performance of the Best Individual from each Generation for Buy-Stock deci-
sion, Mean Over 10 Runs (Note: graph is analyzed in Section 4.1.2.)
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Figure 4.5: Scatterplot of the Fitness Ratio of the Best Individual over Time for Each Run
for Place-Tile Population (Note: graph is analyzed in Section 4.1.1.)
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Figure 4.6: Scatterplot of the Fitness Ratio of the Best Individual over Time for Each Run
for Buy-Stock Population (Note: graph is analyzed in Section 4.1.2.)
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Figure 4.7: Average Standardized Fitness of each Generation for Place-Tile Population,
Mean Over 10 Runs (Note: graph is analyzed in Section 4.1.1.)
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Figure 4.8: Average Standardized Fitness of each Generation for Buy-Stock Population,
Mean Over 10 Runs (Note: graph is analyzed in Section 4.1.2.)
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4.1.2 Buy-Stock Decision Population Evolution
The performance of the best individual in each generation for the Buy-Stock decision pop-
ulation over time is shown in Figure 4.4. This graph is even less encouraging than that for
the Place-Tile population because, in addition to the noise still interfering, the trend line
extrapolated from this data does not even have a positive slope, but is rather much more
flat. Figure 4.6 again shows the scatterplot of each individual run’s data. The cloud again
is stable, showing that no one run acts as an outlier confusing the means, but rather each
run behaves in approximately the same manner as the others. The graph of the average
standardized fitness of the population over time is shown in Figure 4.7. The graph’s noise
makes it difficult to see a trend, but it appears to be also averaging out to a level slope.
Again, note the small scale of the y-axes in these figures.
While discouraging from a superficial (i.e., shape of the graph only) standpoint, the
results from this and the Place-Tile population do not necessarily show absolutely no im-
provement of the populations, however, as discussed in Section 2.2. We deal with the issues
of coevolution and how it can affect the fitness landscape with further experiments outlined
in Section 4.2.
4.1.3 Case Studies of Individuals
In a randomly-chosen Place-Tile evolution run, the best-of-run individual program was
found on generation 37. It was:
(- (STOCK-HELD-BY-PLAYER-IN-CHAIN-3)
(+ (+ (IF-I-AM-MAJ-STOCKHOLDER-IN-CHAIN-2 9
(MERGER-VALUE-OF-CHAIN-3))
(- (PRICE-OF-CHAIN-1) (STOCKS-LEFT-OF-CHAIN-1)))
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-OF-MAXIMUM-SIZE
(- (PRICE-OF-CHAIN-1) (STOCKS-LEFT-OF-CHAIN-1))
(STOCKS-LEFT-OF-CHAIN-1))))
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This parse tree can be rewritten in the following English words: “If I am the current
majority stockholder in the middle chain and if the smallest chain is large enough to satisfy
the end-game condition, the value of the board state is given by the difference between
the quantity of stock I hold in the smallest chain and twice the difference between the
price of the largest chain and the number of stocks left in the largest chain to buy, plus a
constant (9). If the smallest chain is not large enough, the value is the difference between
the quantity of stock I hold in the smallest chain and the sum of the price of the largest
chain plus a constant (9). If I am not the majority stockholder in the middle chain, the
constant in the above conditions is replaced by the merger value of the smallest chain (the
majority stockholder’s bonus, guaranteed to be more than 9).”
This can be further analyzed as follows. If the smallest chain is large enough to end the
game, that means the other chains must be also at least as large. Given that the smallest
chain must be of size 41 to meet the end-game condition, the other two chains must also be
at least of size 41, which makes 123 tiles belonging to the three chains. However, there are
only 108 squares on an Acquire board. Therefore this piece of the strategy will never apply.
Moving to the case where the smallest chain is not yet large enough to end the game, the
value of the board is derived by subtracting the price of the largest chain plus the constant
9 from the amount of stock the player currently holds in the smallest chain. If the player
is not currently the majority stockholder in the middle chain, the value is determined by
subtracting the price of the largest chain plus the merger value of the smallest chain from
the amount of stock the player currently holds in the smallest chain. These seems to create
a drive toward merging the smallest and largest chains if the player does not stand to gain
a great deal of money by merging the largest and middle chains (i.e., he is not the majority
stockholder in the middle chain). When a merger occurs between the smallest and largest
chains, the player will be forced to trade in his stock in the smallest chain for stock in the
largest chain. Therefore, the amount of money he stands to gain from this transaction is
directly given by the amount of stock he owns in the smallest chain and the current price of
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the largest chain, which would be the value of the stock he receives during his trade-in.
In a randomly chosen Buy-Stock evolution run, the best-of-run individual program was
found on generation 44. It was:
(IF-CHAIN-2-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING
(+ 7
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING 2
(STOCK-HELD-BY-PLAYER-IN-CHAIN-1)))
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-OF-MAXIMUM-SIZE 8
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING (PERIMETER-OF-CHAIN-2)
(DIST-TO-NEAREST-NEIGHBOR-OF-CHAIN-3))))
This parse tree can be rewritten in the following English words: “The value of any
given board state resulting from my available stock purchases is dependent upon whether
the middle chain is safe from merging. If it is, the value is 9 if the smallest chain is also
safe from merging, or 7 plus the amount of stock I hold in the largest chain. If it is not,
the value is 8 if the smallest chain is large enough to cause the end of game conditions to
be met, otherwise it is the growth potential of the middle chain if the smallest chain is safe
from merging, and the unlikelihood of an immediate merger of the smallest chain if it is
not safe from merging.”
This individual can be further analyzed as follows. The purpose of this decision is to
determine which chain to purchase stock in during this turn. If the middle chain is safe from
merging, and the smallest chain is also safe from merging, this entails that the largest chain
is also safe from merging (of size 11 or greater). In this case, the end-game conditions
have been met and the game could end at any time; a player at this point only stands to
gain money based on the stocks left in his hand which he will sell at the end of the game.
The case where the smallest chain is not yet safe from merging means that it could still be
merged, and this strategy seems to encode a preference for increasing the amount of stock
held in the largest chain, which will pay off if the smaller chain grows or is swallowed up
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and the game ends, forcing the players to sell their stock. The largest chain’s stock price
will be very high if it is that large. The case where the middle chain is not yet safe from
merging and the smallest chain does satisfy the end-game condition is not possible, and
therefore this branch of the strategy is unused.
However, if the middle chain is not yet safe from merging, the value of the board de-
pends on the growth potential of the middle chain if the smallest chain is also safe from
merging (and therefore, the end of the game could occur at any time). This implies that
the strategy will prefer investing in the middle chain in this case, which may be more af-
fordable than investing in the largest chain, and may be made larger in future turns (growth
potential). Finally, if the middle chain is not yet safe from merging, and the smallest chain
is not, the smallest chain could still merge with the larger or middle chain, and therefore
the immediacy of this potential merger determines the value of the board. This seems to
push for investing in the smallest chain until it merges, in hopes of becoming the majority
stockholder and receiving that payoff.
These both may seem complex, but that is representative of the domain of Acquire.
These strategies make sense in the context of the game. Other strategies which performed
well also had similar structures and complexity. The functions do an adequate job of identi-
fying the most profitable situations and rating them highly, which is, ultimately, the purpose
of the board evaluation function in the first place. While these strategies may not capture
all of the aspects of an Acquire game, the fact that they have been able to identify the situa-
tions they have is promising. These results in themselves justify the purpose of this thesis,
which was to determine if GP could yield competent Acquire players which learn how to
exploit the rules of the game to make money for themselves.
4.2 Measuring Coevolutionary Adaptive Progress
Section 2.2 mentions the so-called “Red Queen effect” which alters coevolutionary inter-
actions: the populations, by nature of their interaction, alter the fitness landscape. Various
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measurement and visualization techniques have been developed to account for this effect
when reporting on genetic programming runs, also discussed in Section 2.2, and we have
adopted a simplified version of one of them here, to attempt to ascertain if any remarkable
progress is occurring during our evolutionary runs at all. [9] and [36] created pictographs
showing the outcomes of round-robin tournaments of the best from each generation against
samples from every other generation; the expectation is that, the more “ancient” an oppo-
nent, the better current individuals should do when pitted against them. To ensure mono-
tonicity of the results, it is essential to test later generation players against earlier ones. [5]
used random samplings of players from each generation against benchmark players from
varying epochs of generations, to test if the population was truly evolving continuously
toward an optimum or simply getting stuck in local optima. The approach we took was
similar but less complex: we played the best individual from the final generation against
the best individual (according to standardized fitness) from each previous generation, where
each pair was played against each other 10 times.
Since we had only one set of data points, we simply plotted the matches as a line graph
(of course, we used the means over all 10 runs). See Figure 4.9 and 4.10 for the graphs for
each decision population. In the Place-Tile population’s graph, there is still the noise issue,
even after sampling over the mean. Yet there is a clear downward trend line, in spite of this
noise. This downward trend means that, as the generations progress back from generation
49 to generation 0, the final generation’s best player is capable of beating them more often,
implying that there is in fact progress of the population as a whole. Yet in the Buy-Stock
population graph, the trend is flat and only starts to be negative toward the end of the runs,
as is shown by the moving average line. It is unclear whether these results are definitive
enough to recommend this technique as it is as a reliable method of evolving these sorts
of board evaluation functions. We would like to see a much more obvious and consistent
trend throughout the generations. Areas for exploration into possible improvements on this
technique are discussed in Section 5.
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Figure 4.9: Results from the “Tournament of Bests”, as represented by the Number of
Wins Recorded for Place-Tile Population, Mean Over 10 Runs (Note: graph is analyzed in
Section 4.2.)
4.3 Obtaining a Combined Strategy
Because we did not evolve the two functions simultaneously (see Section 5.3 for a discus-
sion of this), and because a competent Acquire player must concentrate on both aspects
of gameplay in order to perform well, the final experiment we conducted was a simple
all-pairs competition, using the reports on the GP runs of the best individual from each
generation. We chose the same run we had chosen at random for each population in Sec-
tion 4.1.3, to see how a sample of the best functions from each population would rank when
paired with each other. The competition matched every pair of the best individuals from
each generation (the best individuals from certain generations may be the same or function-
ally equivalent) and played 10 games against a random sampling of other pairs. The pair
with the best score (as represented by the number of wins) is considered to be the strongest
44
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Figure 4.10: Results from the “Tournament of Bests”, as represented by the Number of
Wins Recorded for Buy-Stock Population, Mean Over 10 Runs (Note: graph is analyzed
in Section 4.2.)
Acquire player which we have been able to develop through the technique described in this
thesis.
There were four pairs that won all 10 games played against their opponents; they were
from generations 17 and 45, 19 and 0, 38 and 47, and 46 and 32, where the first number is
the generation of the Place-Tile individual chosen and the second number is the generation
of the Buy-Stock individual chosen. For the programs of these pairs, see Appendix B. We
matched these four pairs against four intermediate human Acquire players, with compara-
bly the same amount of experience with the game, and had them play five games. While it
is not possible to draw firm conclusions about the results of the evolution from this alone,
it is interesting to note that the agents did in fact win about half the games they played
against the humans. The first player lost once, the second and third players lost twice, and
the fourth player actually lost four times, against the agent players. This shows a great
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deal of promise for the evolution of competent Acquire players via this technique. While
the players evolved may not have approached expert level (shown by their apparent lack of
overall population progress), the building blocks to produce good novice players appear to
have been available through this technique.
Ironically, the best-of-run individuals (from generations 37 for Place-Tile and 44 for
Buy-Stock) do not appear in these four top-ranked pairs. The first occurrence of the Place-
Tile individual from generation 37 in the pair rankings is tied with 181 other pairs with
8 wins; the first occurrence of the Buy-Stock individual from generation 44 in the pair
rankings is in another pair in that bracket with 8 wins. This implies that evolving them
separately leads to mediocre results, and that there is a greater degree of intertwining of
the individuals than we had initially foreseen. This point is a strong recommending fac-
tor for the evolution of Place-Tile/Buy-Stock pairs in the same population, rather than as
individuals. See Section 5.3 for more discussion on this topic.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
5.1 Contributions
This work has potentially served to further the evidence that genetic programming is a vi-
able method to use in the development of strategies or board evaluation functions for com-
plex domains such as Acquire, granted some much-needed investigations into the technique
used and the application of various related methods described in the literature on the sub-
ject. We have managed to evolve novice Acquire players using GP techniques; the players
may never have passed a certain level of expertise, but they could hold their own in test
games against humans. We have shown that this technique has promise for this domain,
and have opened the doors for further future work in this area.
5.2 Limitations
Time was a serious limiting factor in the breadth of the experiments we were able to con-
duct. There are many fascinating issues in GP which would have been interesting to ex-
plore. The inability for us to be able to make claims about the objective efficacy of the
strategies developed by our GP runs is a limitation which we expected, as our goal in per-
forming this work was not to create a world-class Acquire player, but simply to see how
possible it was to evolve players for this complex domain in the first place. One observation
which we can make, however, is that, through a series of five games with a group of novice
players and one expert (the author), monetary gains of the players did in fact hover around
the amounts won by the evolved strategies in their own games, when the human players
played with the same set of restrictions on the rules of the game as the agents did.
There are many areas of this work which could be improved, and admittedly, we did not
have fully rationalized reasons for the various GP parameter values we used, other than that
they were Koza’s defaults. However, our domain is significantly different from symbolic
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regression problems, and therefore these parameters may very well be poor choices. Much
literature refers to the problem of parameter-setting as a “black art” [11]. [14, 11] both
discuss the problems inherent in how to choose technique-specific and problem-specific
parameters, such as crossover and mutation ratios, population size, et cetera. It is pointed
out that they are highly interdependent, and that changing one may have effects on the
GP run that are unexpected, due to this interdependence. Parameter control, or tuning of
the parameters during the actual evolutionary run, may provide some better way to guess-
and-check parameter settings. However, this is very computationally expensive in itself,
and may not yield results [11]. The parameter setting conundrum requires many more
empirical results than we quote here to set them in a definitive fashion.
Another limitation was the simplistic nature of the nonterminal set used. For complex
strategies, more robust decision-making is required. There were several logical and deci-
sion operators which we would have liked to include, such as and, or, not and if. These
are known to be useful in evolving decision-making strategies, and there is support in the
literature for their inclusion when evolving strategies or board evaluation functions [16, 15].
Reasons why we did not choose to include them in our approach are discussed in 5.3. Fu-
ture approaches to this problem, and ones like it, will benefit from an exploration of a more
complex function set.
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5.3 Related and Future Work
5.3.1 Richer Terminal and Nonterminal Sets (Strongly-Typed Genetic Programming)
As mentioned above, the functions chosen for the nonterminal set were more simple than
this problem may potentially require. However, Koza’s GP kernel which we used has the
unfortunate requirement of “closure”: all functions must be able to take as their arguments
any terminal or return type from other functions which may result, and the root node must
return the expected type for the program [23]. While this is feasible for symbolic regression
problems, decision problems are too severely limited by this constraint. It would require
rewriting of the decision operators, in our case to accept numeric arguments and return
numeric arguments, which is not feasible and sidesteps their advantages as decision op-
erators in the first place. In Koza’s examples, the non-hamstrung squad car problem (a
variation of the predator-prey game) for which he evolves strategies in Appendix B of his
1992 book [23] uses several conditional functions which have been tailored to his domain
in order to satisfy this constraint (e.g., ifX which takes three arguments, determining what
to do when x is less than 0, equal to 0 or greater than 0). Given that our function set is
already so large as a result of the complexity of the domain and the amount of informa-
tion available to an agent during gameplay, the number of conditional operators would be
unacceptably large.
This problem has been discussed in the literature, however, and as a result of this limita-
tion of Koza’s technique for more complex domains, Montana developed “strongly-typed
genetic programming” (STGP) [30], which operates as an extension to the original GP
paradigm, but allows the return types and argument types of all functions and terminals to
be specified along with each terminal and nonterminal. This not only allows elements such
as logic and decision operators to be included without being specifically tailored to the do-
main or the problem, but it can cut down on the size of the terminal and nonterminal set as
well, through the use of generic functions. While Montana implemented his extensions in
C++, Koza’s LISP kernel could be extended itself to provide STGP via the CommonLISP
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Object System (CLOS). This would relieve some of the computational stress of generating
the population and the possible dilution of the GP technique due to the very large func-
tion sets. For example, the function set may be so large that the GP system cannot fully
explore the space of possible individuals for a given population size. Our population size
of 1000 hopefully relieved that issue to a degree by allowing many more individuals to
be generated. With strongly-typed genetic programming, on the other hand, the functions
which must now be specific to each hotel chain in the game could be rewritten as generic
functions and the STGP system could evolve the correct arguments. This would allow all
seven chains to be used instead of the three-chain simplification we opted to use in these
experiments, and which undoubtedly reduced the amount of money available to be won by
the evolving agents.
5.3.2 Evolution of a Unified Strategy for Acquire via Structurally Constrained GP,
Dynamic GP and the Evolution of Lambda Functions
As mentioned in Section 3.2, we ran an all-pairs competition to see which pair of buy-
stock and place-tile functions worked the best together. This was purely for curiosity’s
sake, and the semi-round-robin tournament as played does not provide an adequate means
of determining the best pair, compared to the possibility of evolving the two functions
simultaneously. The credit assignment problem prevents the two strategies from being
evolved as individuals in separate populations from being a workable solution. The ideal
way to pursue this problem in future would be to adopt a form of structurally-constrained
GP, which forces the individuals being evolved to have two parts, the order of which is
predetermined for ease-of-use within the Acquire system. Then, the individuals are marked
as fit or unfit relative to the population as a whole, rather than as a result of either half of
the strategy. In this way, the credit assignment problem is avoided, but a fully-integrated
agent strategy can be evolved.
Although our goal in providing the large terminal and nonterminal sets that we did was
to avoid biasing our results with preconceived notions from the authors about what would
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make a good strategy, it is of course possible that we still may have inadvertently done
so, especially when one considers the choice of conditional operators we made. With this
potential limitation in mind, several sources in the literature discuss allowing the GP system
to evolve lambda functions [34] or higher-level functions and their sub-behaviors [2, 32], in
addition to being given certain discrete terminals and nonterminals. Since it seems likely
that the function set we have provided for the Acquire domain is in fact too limited to
allow innovative and robust strategies to develop, incorporating this idea of dynamic GP
may ameliorate the results by allowing the GP system to explore areas of the search space
that the authors may not have recognized as useful or necessary at the time of problem
formulation.
A tangent to this idea is the fact that GP operators tend to promote convergence, caus-
ing all individuals to become more similar over time [22]. GP systems tend to require
large populations of individuals to ensure a sufficiently wide sample of the possible search
space, so that encountering appropriately fit individuals is more likely. Therefore, our prob-
lem specification used a population size of 1000. [22] uses an operator called “splitting”
which those authors claim actually discourages convergence; such an approach may help
in the case where Acquire strategies which are evolved are not allowed to become complex
enough because not enough of the search space is explored.
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5.3.3 More Comprehensive Measures of Competitive Coevolution
Enforcing the criteria that new individuals must always be able to defeat previous indi-
viduals will ensure that the population is always progressing, and not stagnating in a local
minimum [36]. Building beyond our very simplistic “tournament of bests”, a “hall of fame”
of sorts can be used to test current individuals against a sample of the past individuals which
were best in their respective generations; a second possibility is to force the fitness of an
individual to be based on its ability to beat the best individual from the previous genera-
tion [39].
Perhaps all that is needed is the use of better visualization techniques to monitor how
the fitness landscape is changing over time and, therefore, to judge the degree of progress
within the population. Several methods have been used in the literature [9, 35, 36, 24]:
tournaments of the population champions against all previous champions (“ancestral oppo-
nent contests”) and distance metrics using similarity of the parse trees developed (“genetic
distance measures”). Although we did use a simplified version of the ancestral opponent
contests in our approach (Section 4.2), the more complete ones in the literature provide a
better global perspective on the population over time. When applied to results from Acquire
GP runs, perhaps more definitive patterns of progress would emerge.
5.3.4 Annealing Schedule of Fitness Metrics as Population Evolves
As was discussed in Section 4.2, a problem with determining progress in competitive co-
evolution is that, as the population progresses through the generations, the coevolution
alters the fitness landscape as the population as a whole improves. In later generations,
when many of the individuals are similar in overall fitness, but still compete against each
other, it will take more games to determine which of two very close competitors is actually
better. Some studies have therefore used an “annealing schedule” of fitness functions [31].
In this model, the number of games played is increased as varying epochs of generations
are reached (i.e., 10 games from 0-100, 15 games from 100-300, 20 games from 300 on).
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Unfortunately, this annealing schedule will be highly domain- and problem-dependent, and
literature which discusses it also states that the schedule was the result of preliminary em-
pirical results [31]. To apply this to Acquire would require further investigation into the
progress of our GP runs.
5.3.5 Use of Internal State to Promote Learning Through Experience
Some literature also makes reference to the possible usefulness of a notion of internal state
throughout the GP run, to allow the individuals in the population to learn via experience
what strategies may have more promise [25, 28]. However, it seems that this is most useful
in static environments where the evolving strategies can operate on the same configura-
tion of the world in each iteration, such as in the wumpus world [42, 41] or in the Map-
maker/Map-user domain of [1]. Agents operating in the Acquire domain may be able to
profit from these methods, even though the world is highly variable from game to game,
because the rules of the game and dynamics of the domain remain the same. A strategy
which does well in one game may do poorly in another and be mutated in some fashion,
causing it to no longer perform well in the game scenarios it initially encountered, because
they are no longer accessible. Guiding the evolution process aided by learning through
experience with past game situations may yield more robust individuals in the long run,
capable of handling many strategic nuances.
5.3.6 Changing the Representation to Neural Networks
Much work has been done where strategies for games or board evaluation functions are
evolved using neural networks as the representation. The representation of the problem is a
limiting factor on how well a technique will do in solving a particular problem; linear func-
tions may not be complex enough to yield appropriately complex strategies for domains
like Acquire. Neural networks, as nonlinear functions, are much more flexible and capable
of abstracting the behavior of a strategy [7]. Neural networks have already been applied
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to the games of Checkers [38, 8, 6], Backgammon [43, 31], Go [24], Tic-Tac-Toe [7], and
others. This avenue may hold promise for the evolution of more adaptive, more robust, and
stronger Acquire strategies or board evaluation functions. As [7] states, “it is a fundamental
problem to treat non-linear problems as if they were linear” (p. 3). Perhaps that was our
mistake here.
5.4 Summary
This thesis presented work which applied genetic programming techniques to the evolution
of board evaluation functions for a complex strategy game called Acquire. We demon-
strated that it is in fact possible to develop strategies for the Acquire domain using these
techniques, but that these techniques have a long way to go before they can produce players
on a high level of competence. Evolution was not encouraged enough during our exper-
iments, and for this reason, further exploration into modified techniques is needed. Our
experiments have laid the groundwork for future studies in these areas, by expanding the
current experiments to include more runs, a richer function set, and ultimately applying
these techniques to more complex domains than Tic-Tac-Toe and Othello. The problem
is by no means solved—there are many avenues which were only touched upon during
our work. It is our hope that these efforts open up an interest in non-minimax games like
Acquire, and lead to the possibility of further explorations of these topics.
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Appendix A Terminals and Nonterminals Used in the Acquire Problem
Table A1: Some Terminals Used in the Acquire GP Problem Formulation
Terminal Description
(cash-held-by-player) this function returns the amount of cash held
by the current player as a result of the move
being considered (i.e., if the player buys
stock, how much money will he have left)
(dist-to-nearest-neighbor-of-chain-1)
(dist-to-nearest-neighbor-of-chain-2)
(dist-to-nearest-neighbor-of-chain-3)
these functions return the Manhattan distance
to the nearest neighboring chain to the respec-
tive chain, as a result of the move being con-
sidered
(how-many-opponents) this function returns how many opponents the
current player is facing
(merger-value-of-chain-1)
(merger-value-of-chain-2)
(merger-value-of-chain-3)
these functions return the majority stock-
holder’s bonus for the respective chain as a
result of the move being considered
(payoff-value-to-player-of-chain-1)
(payoff-value-to-player-of-chain-2)
(payoff-value-to-player-of-chain-3)
these functions return the payoff to the cur-
rent player if a merger were to take place (i.e.,
if he receives a bonus, how much, plus how
much money he would receive for selling his
stock) of the respective chain, as a result of
the move being considered
(perimeter-of-chain-1)
(perimeter-of-chain-2)
(perimeter-of-chain-3)
these functions return the perimeter measure-
ment of the respective chain on the board (i.e.,
all adjacent tiles which, if played, would add
to the size of the chain), as a result of the
move being considered
(price-of-chain-1)
(price-of-chain-2)
(price-of-chain-3)
these functions return the price of stock in the
respective chain as a result of the move being
considered
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Table A2: Some Terminals Used in the Acquire GP Problem Formulation
Terminal Description
(size-of-chain-1)
(size-of-chain-2)
(size-of-chain-3)
these functions return the size of the respec-
tive chain as a consequence of the move being
considered
(stock-held-by-player-in-chain-1)
(stock-held-by-player-in-chain-2)
(stock-held-by-player-in-chain-3)
these functions return how much stock will
be held by the current player in the respec-
tive chain as a consequence of the move being
considered
(stocks-left-of-chain-1)
(stocks-left-of-chain-2)
(stocks-left-of-chain-3)
these functions return the number of stocks
available to purchase in the respective chain
as a result of the move being considered
0..9 the integer digits from 0 to 9
:floating-point-random-constant a ephemeral random floating point constant,
as per [23]
Table A3: Nonterminals Used in the Acquire GP Problem Formulation
Nonterminal Description
+ addition of 2 arguments
- subtraction of 2 arguments
* multiplication of 2 arguments
div protected division function (returns 0 if di-
vide by zero is attempted)
(if-i-am-maj-stockholder-in-chain-1)
(if-i-am-maj-stockholder-in-chain-2)
(if-i-am-maj-stockholder-in-chain-3)
if the player is the majority stockholder in the
respective chain, executes the first argument,
otherwise executes the second
(if-chain-1-is-of-maximum-size)
(if-chain-2-is-of-maximum-size)
(if-chain-3-is-of-maximum-size)
if the respective chain is big enough to meet
the endgame condition, executes the first ar-
gument, otherwise executes the second
(if-chain-1-is-safe-from-merging)
(if-chain-2-is-safe-from-merging)
(if-chain-3-is-safe-from-merging)
if the respective chain is too big to be taken
over by another chain, executes the first argu-
ment, otherwise executes the second
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Appendix B Parse Trees of the Top Four Ranked Pairs in the All-Pairs Tournament
 Pair 1—Place-Tile from generation 17:
(- (IF-I-AM-MAJ-STOCKHOLDER-IN-CHAIN-2
(* (DIV (PERIMETER-OF-CHAIN-2)
(STOCK-HELD-BY-PLAYER-IN-CHAIN-2))
(SIZE-OF-CHAIN-2))
(IF-CHAIN-1-IS-OF-MAXIMUM-SIZE
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-OF-MAXIMUM-SIZE
(SIZE-OF-CHAIN-3) (STOCK-HELD-BY-PLAYER-IN-CHAIN-1))
(IF-I-AM-MAJ-STOCKHOLDER-IN-CHAIN-3
(PAYOFF-VALUE-TO-PLAYER-OF-CHAIN-2) 2)))
(+ (+ (IF-I-AM-MAJ-STOCKHOLDER-IN-CHAIN-2 9
(MERGER-VALUE-OF-CHAIN-3))
(- (PRICE-OF-CHAIN-1) (STOCKS-LEFT-OF-CHAIN-1)))
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING
(STOCK-HELD-BY-PLAYER-IN-CHAIN-3)
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-OF-MAXIMUM-SIZE
(SIZE-OF-CHAIN-3) (MERGER-VALUE-OF-CHAIN-1)))))
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—Buy-Stock from generation 45:
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING
(IF-CHAIN-2-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING
(IF-CHAIN-1-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING 1
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING 2 1))
(IF-CHAIN-2-IS-OF-MAXIMUM-SIZE 9 (SIZE-OF-CHAIN-2)))
(+ (IF-CHAIN-3-IS-OF-MAXIMUM-SIZE 1 7)
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING 2 1)))
 Pair 2—Place-Tile from generation 19:
(- (IF-CHAIN-3-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING
(DIST-TO-NEAREST-NEIGHBOR-OF-CHAIN-3)
(STOCK-HELD-BY-PLAYER-IN-CHAIN-1))
(+ (+ (IF-I-AM-MAJ-STOCKHOLDER-IN-CHAIN-2
(DIST-TO-NEAREST-NEIGHBOR-OF-CHAIN-1)
(MERGER-VALUE-OF-CHAIN-3))
(- (PRICE-OF-CHAIN-1)
(PAYOFF-VALUE-TO-PLAYER-OF-CHAIN-3)))
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING
(IF-CHAIN-2-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING
(DIST-TO-NEAREST-NEIGHBOR-OF-CHAIN-3)
(STOCK-HELD-BY-PLAYER-IN-CHAIN-3))
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-OF-MAXIMUM-SIZE
(SIZE-OF-CHAIN-3)
(STOCKS-LEFT-OF-CHAIN-1)))))
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—Buy-Stock from generation 0:
(- (* (STOCK-HELD-BY-PLAYER-IN-CHAIN-1)
0)
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-OF-MAXIMUM-SIZE
4
(SIZE-OF-CHAIN-1)))
 Pair 3—Place-Tile from generation 38:
(- (IF-I-AM-MAJ-STOCKHOLDER-IN-CHAIN-2
(IF-CHAIN-2-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING
(DIST-TO-NEAREST-NEIGHBOR-OF-CHAIN-3)
(STOCK-HELD-BY-PLAYER-IN-CHAIN-3))
(IF-I-AM-MAJ-STOCKHOLDER-IN-CHAIN-2
(STOCK-HELD-BY-PLAYER-IN-CHAIN-2)
(PRICE-OF-CHAIN-1)))
(+ (+ (MERGER-VALUE-OF-CHAIN-3)
(- (PRICE-OF-CHAIN-1)
(STOCKS-LEFT-OF-CHAIN-3)))
(PERIMETER-OF-CHAIN-2)))
—Buy-Stock from generation 47:
(* (IF-CHAIN-2-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING
(DIST-TO-NEAREST-NEIGHBOR-OF-CHAIN-3) 8)
1)
(+ (MERGER-VALUE-OF-CHAIN-3) 9))
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 Pair 4—Place-Tile from generation 46:
(- (DIST-TO-NEAREST-NEIGHBOR-OF-CHAIN-1)
(+ (IF-I-AM-MAJ-STOCKHOLDER-IN-CHAIN-2
(SIZE-OF-CHAIN-2)
(MERGER-VALUE-OF-CHAIN-3))
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-OF-MAXIMUM-SIZE
(MERGER-VALUE-OF-CHAIN-3)
(STOCKS-LEFT-OF-CHAIN-1))))
—Buy-Stock from generation 32:
(DIV (MERGER-VALUE-OF-CHAIN-2)
(IF-I-AM-MAJ-STOCKHOLDER-IN-CHAIN-3
(IF-CHAIN-3-IS-SAFE-FROM-MERGING 2 1)
(PERIMETER-OF-CHAIN-3)))
